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Abstract
The concept of a mechanism has become a standard proposal for explanations in
biology. It has been claimed that mechanistic explanations are appropriate for
systems biology, because they occupy a middle ground between strict reductionism
and holism. Because of their importance in the field a formal ontological description
of mechanisms is desirable. The standard philosophical accounts of mechanisms are
often ambiguous and lack the clarity that can be provided by a formal-ontological
framework. The goal of this paper is to clarify some of these ambiguities and suggest
such a framework for mechanisms. Taking some hints from an “ontology of devices” I
suggest as a general approach for this task the introduction of functional kinds and
functional parts by which the particular relations between a mechanism and its
components can be captured.
Background
The concept of a mechanism has in recent years become a standard philosophical pro-
posal for explanations in biology and other sciences of complex systems where the tra-
ditional approach, subsumption under universal laws, has not been fruitful. This is in
agreement with the practice of these sciences where the postulation of mechanisms on
several levels (organismic, cellular, molecular, biochemical) is a common research prac-
tice: A stable behaviour of some biological system is explained by the description of a
(postulated) mechanism that is causally responsible for this behaviour [1-5]. Familiar
examples include photosynthesis or protein biosynthesis; diseases are associated with
mechanisms as well as the action of drugs [6]. The actual discovery of such a postu-
lated mechanism is of course non-trivial and often a seminal scientific achievement.
Whereas mechanistic explanations in biology have usually been mostly qualitative, Sys-
tems Biology is working with powerful mathematical tools and striving for quantitative
results. Scientists working in the field have expressed the hope to get a better picture
of biological reality if the computational approach could be aligned with mechanistic
approaches [7]. The philosophical discussions of mechanisms often focus on explana-
tion, not ontology, and suffer from ambiguities and lack of clarity that could be
amended by a more formal approach. The following considerations hope to give some
first steps in this direction by an ontological analysis of mechanisms. Though the work
presented here is conceptual groundwork, there is a rich field of possible applications
in biomedical knowledge representation and knowledge eliciting.
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Ontology should answer the question into which fundamental category something
falls. To find out what a mechanism is, I will start with some definitions from the
literature, discuss options for categories for the components of mechanisms and the
mechanism as a whole, and suggest with which relations they could be tied together to
constitute a mechanism. It should be noted beforehand, however, that the suggestions
in this paper are not meant to necessarily imply a universal mechanistic and reduction-
ist world view. Different authors use somewhat different notions of “mechanism” or
“mechanistic” depending on their respective background in biology, philosophy, physics
or information science. It will be clarified in the following that mechanism in the sense
used here is dependent on functional concepts and thus not reductionist in the sense
criticized by Robert Rosen [8,9]. Rosen contrasts mechanistic causation with biological
final causation. In his view a mechanistic system is characterized by deterministic and
computable behavior, that is any full description of a state of the system together with
the mathematical operator for time evolution or the system’s equations of motion
determines the system states at later times. These systems can also be captured com-
pletely by a reductionist analysis of their components, i.e. the behaviour of the whole is
completely determined by the behaviour of its parts ("bottom up” causation). On the
contrary, certain types of systems such as biological ones are, according to Rosen, dis-
tinguished by the fact that they cannot be described adequately in “purely mechanistic”
terms, because they exhibit features like the whole determining the behaviour of its
parts ("top down causation”). An appraisal of Rosen’s criticism and his very general
formal distinctions between mechanistic (in the narrow sense used by him) and biolo-
gical systems and their modes of causation has to be left for another occasion as the
very possibility of top-down causation is a hotly contested topic in the philosophy of
science. In any case, many proponents of mechanisms in the philosophy of biology
seem to take their position as intermediary between “hard reductionism” (like the one
criticized by Rosen as “mechanistic”) and holism [10]. Furthermore, the claim that
organisms contain (many) mechanisms is not meant to imply that all organisms are to
be identified with mechanisms. An ontology that recognizes some important biological
entities as mechanisms does not imply a universal mechanistic ontology of biology (or
the whole world).
What is a mechanism? - some definitions
Here are three different definitions for mechanisms from the literature on philosophy
of biology:
“A mechanism for a behavior is a complex system that produces that behavior by the
interaction of a number of parts, where the interactions between parts can be charac-
terized by direct, change-relating generalizations.” [2]
“Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are productive of
regular changes from start or set-up to finish or terminating conditions.” [1]
“A mechanism is a structure performing a function in virtue of its component parts,
component operations, and their organization. The orchestrated functioning of the
mechanism is responsible for one or more phenomena.” [3]
All three conceptions identify several features which are important for the characteri-
zation of mechanisms: Mechanisms are (1) for a specific behaviour, which can be char-
acterized functionally by a specific input and output; they are (2) not merely stating
Röhl Journal of Biomedical Semantics 2012, 3(Suppl 2):S9
http://www.jbiomedsem.com/content/3/S2/S9
Page 2 of 14
such input-output-correlations, but show the “inner workings” producing the output;
they exhibit (3) a kind of continuity and lead without gaps from initial conditions to
final states, and they are (4) complex structures and may, in general, have submechan-
isms at a lower level of granularity.
The first two definitions have difficulties dealing with cyclical mechanisms that can-
not be simply characterized by initial or final states [4]. This can be taken care of, if
one thinks of the function performed by a mechanism in a more general way: A cycli-
cal mechanism for maintaining some balance of concentrations, for example, will take
as input any state of the system to be controlled, and if the value of the concentration
ratio of this system is not within some tolerance interval, the mechanism will produce
as output a state with a value within the interval. So the input/output states do not
have to be thought of as temporally strictly ordered initial and final states. The key fea-
tures seem to be that mechanisms are on the one hand functionally characterized, and
on the other hand they are complex systems and the consecutive actions of their com-
ponents together realize the function of the whole.
Furthermore, it could be asked, whether and on which grounds there is a distinction
between mechanisms and biochemical “pathways” as the usage of these terms in the
scientific community seems almost interchangeable. One difference seems to be that
pathways are mostly chains of chemical reactions and transport phenomena involving
freely floating biomolecules, whereas mechanisms are more clearly localized and
involve stable material structures. For now I will assume that the mechanisms consid-
ered here deal with stable and localized structures. An expansion to systems that are
not characterised by stable individual continuants, but by concentrations of “stuffs”
that vary in time has to be left for another occasion. But I assume that the approach
sketched below is sufficiently general to be extendable to pathways in the latter sense.
Methods
I will first propose an ontological analysis of mechanisms and appropriate categories
for their components, then look into the relationships and connections between them,
and finally discuss the possible category choices for the mechanism as a whole. For
that purpose something will have to be said about functions and functional parts.
Components of a mechanism
According to the definitions above mechanisms have two types of components or
parts: “entities” and “interactions” or “activities”. An expression like “entity” is too gen-
eral to be taken seriously as a suggestion for an ontological category (because usually
everything that exists is taken to be an entity of some sorts). What these authors
apparently mean with “entities” in the definitions above are stable material parts of the
mechanism. According to the top level ontology BFO [11] which we will take as our
ontological framework, these can be classified as independent continuants. (In the
DOLCE ontology they would be called “physical endurants” [12].) In BFO independent
continuant entities are what we would think of as “things”, i.e., entities that can change
in time, that is, they can exhibit different properties or states at different points in
time, while retaining their identity, but do not have temporal parts. In contrast, occur-
rents (DOLCE: “perdurants”) are entities like events or processes that take place in
time and have temporal parts (phases or stages). Occurrents are dependent entities;
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they always need at least one independent continuant to participate in them. (A run-
ning process is for its existence dependent on least one runner enacting this running
process.)
The material components of a mechanism are identified functionally according to
their contribution for the behaviour characteristic of that mechanism as a whole.
(More about functional contributions will be said below.) They are parts of the
mechanism, but this is not sufficient, as not all parts of a mechanism are recognized as
salient components. This is dependent on context, usually the context of the very
mechanism in question. It is not just a question of parthood and granularity. E.g., the
„pumped” H+-ions (protons) or the electrons transported by the electron transport
chain in photosynthesis are components of the respective mechanisms (submechanisms
of photosynthesis), because they contribute to the action of these mechanisms. But the
protons and electrons of the atoms of the molecules that are not involved and do not
contribute to the action of the mechanism are not components, although of course
material parts (by transitivity of the parthood relation) of the whole material conglom-
erate. What about the other type of components and their relationship to the material
components?
Activities and interactions - the dynamics of a mechanism
Obviously the material components of a mechanism must be dynamically connected
and integrated into the whole that is to be captured under the description of a
mechanism. There is a dispute how this should be reflected by the ontological analysis.
One option is to understand the interactions as relations between the continuants as
proposed by Stuart Glennan: An “interaction” is taken to be a “correlative property
change”, “an occasion on which a change in a property of one part brings about a
change in a property of another part” [2]. These correlations would be mere relations
between the material components and their properties, and “interactions” would there-
fore not be entities in the narrower sense of a fundamental ontological category. To
avoid regress the “interaction relation” between the components has to be immediate,
i.e. the interactions must not be mediated by further intermediary components. On the
other hand one can argue as Darden, Machamer and Craver do that to represent the
dynamics of a mechanism it is not enough to use only the material components and
their relations, but opt for the acceptance of “activities” as a separate class of entities
in their own right: “Activities are the producers of change. Entities are the things that
engage in activities. [...] An activity is usually designated by a verb or verb form [...].
They are constitutive of the transformations that yield new states of affairs or new
products.” [1]
According to this position, interactions would merely record the result of transitions
between different states of the material components whereas activities would give a
better, more complete description. Causal efficacy could only be ascribed to the mate-
rial components if their specific activities were taken into account. Furthermore, the
continuity and regularity of the temporal phases of an active mechanism could only be
guaranteed by the acceptance of activities because they connect the states of the mate-
rial components and thus assure a “productive continuity” between these phases.
Machamer et al. claim that the dynamic behaviour of mechanisms would be captured
better with activities as either themselves changes or producers of change than with
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only the results of changes (Glennans “interactions”). So according to Glennan interac-
tions are mere relations dependent on their relata, they are not to be “reified” and do
not form an additional ontological category. According to Machamer et al. activities
are some kind of processes in which material components take part. If we accept those
additional elements in our ontology we can classify “activities” as processual entities
with temporal parts or phases, that is as occurents in the terminology above (DOLCE:
perdurants).
James Tabery has suggested an intermediate position [13], accepting both interactions
and activities as complementary to each other. Tabery starts with Glennan’s conception
of interactions as “occasion[s] on which a change in a property of one part brings about
a change in a property of another part” [13]. This “bringing about” could be analysed
further in terms of activities. An activity determines more precisely how such a correla-
tive change is achieved: “For the dualists, the activity is the dynamic process of bringing
about“ [13]. But interactions are necessary, too, because there are productive as well as
non-productive activities. The latter do not involve another interacting entity, e.g.
changes of the geometrical conformations that only concern one molecule. Therefore,
so Tabery, interactions are needed to distinguish productive from non-productive activ-
ities. To integrate activities into Glennan’s account Tabery simply replaces in the defini-
tion of an interaction “brings about” by “dynamically produces": „an occasion on which a
change in a property of one part dynamically produces a change in a property of another
part” [13] (italics added). And activities are responsible for the dynamical production.
The ontological implications of Tabery’s suggestion are not completely clear as the rela-
tion between activities and interactions is not explained. One could understand activities
as “realisers” of interactions: interactions would just record the mere correlations of
property instances of two or more particulars and activities would contribute additional
information about the course of the change. With a different reading the class of interac-
tions could be taken to have two subclasses, “nonproductive” and “productive” interac-
tions, and activities would then be the productive subtype of interactions. In any case, if
Tabery’s proposal is taken ontologically serious, it speaks against taking interactions as
mere relations and in favour of accepting an additional ontological category of dynamic,
occurent entities like the activities mentioned above.
Besides capturing the notion of dynamicity there are further advantages to an
approach that accepts not only continuants and their relations, but also processes or
occurrents. Current top level ontologies like BFO and DOLCE all recognize this need
for occurrents. The continuants involved in the interaction are connected to occurrents
by a relation like “participates_in” that expresses the involvement of one or more con-
tinuants in a process. By this “reification” of interaction processes one avoids having to
deal with relations with different arities, if an interaction type can have tokens with dif-
ferent numbers of participants. (It should also be noted that in description logics like
OWL DL relations with more than two relata are difficult to model. With a top level
ontology that includes processes this restriction can often be worked around in a intui-
tively appealing way.) And with occurrents one can model the location, frequency and
other interesting features of these interaction processes or facts about their preceding
or following each other and define corresponding relations.(Cf. [14] for detailed argu-
ments for the usefulness of admitting occurrents as a distinct category for representing
molecular interactions.)
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A note on the sometimes confusing terminology: In the Gene Ontology [15] the term
“activity” is used to describe molecular functions, like “catalytic activity”. In the GO this
means that the specific component has the function (or disposition) to initiate or take
part in this activity, not that activity, that is, the actual contribution to the process of a
chemical reaction, itself. Whereas in the discussion summarized above and throughout
this paper, “activities” are used as the processes within the structure of a mechanism.
I will usually call interactions “processes” and ignore the difference to processes that
involve only one participant and are therefore not interactions in the strict sense.
So as a first result we can conclude that the material components of mechanisms (like
ions, cell membranes etc.) can be classified as continuants. Furthermore there are “proces-
sual components”, that is the actual interaction processes going on in a mechanism (trans-
porting of ions, energetic exciting of electrons etc.). These basic types of components are
connected by relations like participation. Before discussing these relations between the
material components and processes of a mechanism in more detail, I will turn to the ques-
tion how the mechanism as a whole should be ontologically classified. For this purpose I
will first describe an approach that suggests a very strong connection between a material
structure and specific processes it can be involved in.
The device ontology
A very general framework to analyze the mutual dependence of continuants, functions
and processes has been suggested by Antony Galton and Riichiro Mizoguchi [16]. This
has been developed for applications in the ontology of engineering, but is sufficiently
general for our purposes. Starting from the analysis of engineering devices in their
“ontology of devices” not only artefacts, but almost any kind of material entity can be
considered as a “device” in the following general sense: A device is an object that is
essentially characterized (functionally) by the input/output it can produce (apart from
that it is a “black box”). But to generate that output the object has to undergo or “enact”
a process: “an object [...] is characterized in terms of the processes it enacts. These are
what we call the external processes or behaviour of the object” [16]. We thus have a
tightly interrelated triple of <object, function, process>: The object “enacts” its “external
processes”, which produce “the generation of output from input” [16]. E.g., in photo-
synthesis, the object “photosystem I” has the function to transform the input light energy
into the output chemical energy. If we look inside the “black box” we find “subdevices”
with specific processes that are internal to the higher-level device and causally responsi-
ble for its external processes. And on any level the identity of an object depends on its
function or disposition for external processes: “an object is a unity which is what enacts
its external processes” [16]. Such a nested structure of objects essentially characterized
by their functions or their ability to enact specific processes corresponds very well to the
mechanistic approach in biology as described so far. The regress of structures (devices
within devices) has to be stopped at some basic physical level, but this is not important
for the purpose here. For biological mechanisms there will always be some ground level
of chemical or physical entities and their interactions.
The mechanism as a whole
There are conflicting intuitions into which category a mechanism as a whole should
belong. Glennan thinks that it should be thought of as a continuant; a mechanism is a
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“thing” like a clock or a cell, because of its endurance and stability compared to a
process or chain of events [2]. Similarly, Bechtel: “it consists of an arrangement of
parts and has at least some enduring identity” [5]. On the other hand the mechanism
could be thought of as a process. It should be noted that from the fact that a mechan-
ism has processes as “components” it does not follow immediately that the mechanism
has to be a process itself, because not only a process can contain processes (cf. the
“device ontology”). The processes do not have to be considered parts in the usual
sense, but containment can mean that process tokens have locations within the bound-
aries of the continuant. But it seems clear that the unfolding activity of a mechanism
has temporal stages characterized by the sequence of processes its components enact.
(In fact, this was used above as a motivation for the acceptance of internal processes
instead of mere correlations.) And in our top level ontology BFO the only entities with
such an explicit temporal structure are occurrents. So it might seem that a mechanism
as a whole has to be a process. But what if a mechanism is not active? It seems that
the mechanism is still in existence as a mechanism without any (external) process
going on (like the case of a stopped clock that needs to be wound up). So if we want
to recognize mechanisms as entities that persist as mechanisms even while they are
not active, the mechanism cannot be categorized as a process.
If we take the mechanism as a generalized “device” in the sense of Galton and Mizoguchi,
we might be able to do justice to both intuitions. We take the mechanism to be an inde-
pendent continuant. It has a structure and parts, but it is also sufficiently unified and delim-
ited that, as a whole, it can be considered as a kind of continuant. But it is functionally
characterized, that means its very identity as a mechanism depends on its function for its
specific process. In photosynthesis, the process of the conversion of light energy to chemi-
cal energy sets all the structures and material parts apart that contribute to this function
and unifies them into the “thing” biologists call the photosynthesis mechanism. This close
connection and mutual dependency of continuant, specific function and process also
explains the initial uncertainty and conflicting intuitions about the appropriate category for
a mechanism. Following the idea of the ontology of devices this can be expressed by the
ascription of a specific function as essential for the mechanism. Mechanisms are then con-
tinuants and classified as functional kinds. If the function is an essential feature of a
mechanism this would imply that the latter would cease to exist as such, should it lose the
ability to perform its function. This seems rather strong for some cases, because we would
usually classify a broken device or mechanism that has for a while lost its essential function
still as an instance of the respective functional kind, e.g. a car that has to be repaired to be
able to perform its usual function again, still is car. We would not say that the broken
down car ceases to exist as a car and later comes into being again after having been
repaired. There is some flexibility, probably domain dependent, how far beyond repair or
recovery with respect to the exercise of its function something would have to be, to not
longer be classified as a specific mechanism for this function.
Functions and dispositions
So it turns out that a further element is necessary for the ontological connection of
continuants with processes and has to be elucidated: functions and dispositions.
Authors in the debate acknowledge that the characteristic processes of mechanisms
and their components should be based on specific properties of the continuant
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components of the mechanism [1] and admit explicitly or implicitly the necessity of
dispositions, so Glennan: “[T]he systems as a whole have stable dispositions - the beha-
vior of these mechanisms” [2] and Tabery: “The interaction, then, is the event whereby
one part induces a property change on another part by virtue of its own change-relat-
ing capability” [13]. The latter is just an awkward description of the connection
between dispositional properties of the components and their interaction in virtue of
theses dispositions. Care should be taken not to confuse the disposition and the pro-
cess it is a disposition for (as seems to be the case in the quotation from Glennan).
What kinds of entities are we dealing with? A common philosophical position takes
dispositions as a type of properties [17]. The central point is that dispositions are
essentially related to a process of realization. Something is water-soluble if it dissolves
when put in water. In this fashion dispositions establish a link between continuants
and processes and the fundamental connection is the following: Continuant S has
disposition D for realization P and S, the bearer of the disposition, is a participant in
this process P. In formal ontology, a suggestion is to treat dispositions as a kind of
dependent continuants (in this respect analogous to qualities) and express the link to a
process of realization by calling them “realizables” [18], see also [19] and [20] for more
on this topic.
The concept of a function has been even more widely and controversially discussed
in the philosophy of biology and elsewhere (cf. [21] and [22] for recent contributions
to this debate, see also [23], chapters 5 and 14). An elaborate formal ontology of func-
tions has been proposed in [24]. Both for lack of space and because I do not want to
presuppose particular accounts of functions and functional roles, I will rely only on
very general features of the concept of a function (apparently shared by Burek et al.
[24], although their account contains more detail). Among the different approaches to
functions in the philosophical debate two are of particular interest here: The “causal
role analysis” and the “goal contribution analysis” (summarized by its main proponent
Christopher Boorse in [25] which also contains further references). The former account
is very straightforward and close to the way I have used “functional” so far in this
paper: That × has function f simply means that × has the disposition to causally contri-
bute to some output o of a complex system s. A well-known problem is that this
account is extremely broad, actually too broad and admits many unintuitive “func-
tions”, e.g. that clouds should be ascribed the “function” to produce rain, because they
undoubtedly have a central causal role in the production of rain (this and more exam-
ples and further criticism in [25]), whereas the usual sense of functions is connected
with some intention as in artefactual functions or a (not necessarily intended or con-
scious) goal in biological functions. Boorse’s goal contribution approach takes this fea-
ture into account: “X performs function Z in the G-ing of S at t if and only if at t, the
Z-ing of × is a causal contribution to G” [25]. This is still a rather weak definition,
because some functions could be performed only in one single case and fulfil it acci-
dentally [25]. A stronger account can capture what is usually meant, if we distinguish
between proper functions and accidental functions, which will be elucidated below.
In the top level ontology BFO functions, like dispositions (and roles) are “realizable
dependent continuants” [18]. That means a function is dependent (like a property) on
the independent continuant that is the bearer of the function. “Realizable” means as
with dispositions that the instances of a function type are connected to processes, their
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realizations. These are processes with the bearer of the function as a participant. So we
can translate Boorse’s definition above into our terminology: Take × to belong to the
class of continuants and be a part of a mechanism, then (the system) S is a mechanism
and Z is a function. G would be the goal, that is a final state of the complete mechan-
ism, “G-ing” is the process the mechanism enacts and “Z-ing” is the realization process
of the function Z. (Below I will not distinguish further between “G” as a goal state and
“G-ing” as process, but speak only of the realization process.)
A few remarks are in order here: Not all processes involving the bearer of the func-
tion are realizations of (one of) its functions, but every realization of the function
involves its bearer as participant. If I drop a watch and it breaks, this breaking is a pro-
cess involving the watch, but obviously not a process that counts as a realization of the
function of the watch. A standard example is the concomitant production of noise
made by the heart when it realizes its proper function to pump blood. It is a process
caused by the action of the heart, but it is not the proper function of the heart to
make that noise. And functions do not have to be (always or ever) realized, as e.g. in
the case of a safety mechanism the function of which will only be realized if certain
conditions obtain (and they may never obtain). I will ignore the complications of this
modal feature for now. Dispositions are very similar in this last respect and are dis-
cussed at some length in [20].
About the relation of functions and dispositions the following can be said: both share
the feature that they are “realizables” [18,19], that is they are essentially connected to a
realization process, but that process will only take place if certain conditions are met.
A difference between functions and dispositions lies in their context-dependence.
Dispositions are inhering properties that do not depend on context. Continuants may
lose or acquire dispositions, but many of them are not easily changed without funda-
mental changes to the bearer. In contrast, most functions can be performed by differ-
ent types of bearers and an object may have different functions in different contexts
without any change in itself. In my view, functions are based on dispositions, because
the dispositions of a thing determine whether it can fulfil the respective function in a
given context at all. (Electrons can only have the function to build a gradient in the
electron transport chain because of their disposition charge.) This context-dependence
is also connected with the problem of the distinction between proper and accidental
function. To illustrate this with an example from the domain of artefacts: One function
of a hammer is to drive in nails, a process token of hammering in one particular nail is
a realization token of this function of this hammer, and the hammer is of course a par-
ticipant in this process. Therefore a necessary condition for being a hammer is that it
can participate in nailing processes which are realizations of its function. For a full
definition one could introduce the intention that the hammer has been designed for
this particular proper function. But a nail may also be driven in with help of a stone,
so the stone could also perform the “hammering function” to some extent. According
to the causal role and the goal contribution accounts in such a case this stone then
has the function to drive in a nail. But hammering is not an essential function of the
stone, rather an accidental one. This is different with many biological functions as
these are not designed by intentions, but have evolved naturally. Still, we may draw
the distinction between proper function and accidental function. We can ameliorate
the problem of context-dependence and proper vs. accidental function in taking the
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mechanism in question as the relevant context that delimits the proper functions of its
parts. We are not interested in any possible accidental function or in any possible con-
text, but only in specific functions of parts within a specific mechanism. With this
account of functions we can now define the class of functional kinds.
Results and discussion
Formal relations for the representation of mechanisms
I follow the suggestions of Smith et al. [26] and regard as primitive the particular level
relations instance_of (which holds between a particular and its classes, both for pro-
cesses and continuants) and has_participant (which holds between particular pro-
cesses and particular continuants). I also adopt the convention of using boldface for
relations involving particulars and italics for relations between types. I use lower case
letters for variables for instances and italicized upper case for variables for classes,
while I both italicize and capitalize terms for classes. In addition, I use the particular
level relation inheres_in, which holds between individual instances of dependent and
independent continuants [14]. It expresses a kind of one-sided ontological dependence,
i.e. if p inheres_in x, then it is possible that × exists without p, but not that p exists
without x. To avoid proliferation of relations I will stick to established relations when
possible.
M is a functional kind := ∃F(F is a function ∧ M has function F∧
∀x∀f (f instance of F ∧ x has function f → x instance of M) (1)
The specific function has to be assigned by way of definition to the specific kind in
question. The classification of a mechanism as something which essentially has a speci-
fic function is necessary, but not sufficient. For a mechanism like photosynthesis to be
what it is, the inner structure of the mechanism is also important, the material parts
and their organization as well as the processes going on among them. So a mechanism
has to have some substructure and functional organization. The explanatory value of a
mechanism rests on this: The function of the whole is explained by the interplay of the
functions of the parts. I will now try to capture these relations between a mechanism
and its components as well as the relations between the components.
Functional kinds and functional parts
It seems clear that the material components are parts of a mechanism, but the usual
part-whole relation is too weak to capture the more specific relation of a mechanism
to its components. More sophisticated subrelations taking into account granularity
levels ([27] and the BioTop ontology [28,29]) do not help much either. A mechanism
is clearly not a (homogeneous) collection of “grains”. It is also doubtful whether the
notion of a compound with components helps here, because of the “structure blind-
ness” of the compound/component relation. Furthermore, the working parts can
belong to different granularity levels: Pumped H+ ions are (almost) elementary particles
whereas the thylakoid membrane is on the level of cellular components. (This “level
crossing” seems more the rule than the exception in cellular biology, cf. [10]). Mainly
the functional role matters. So my suggestion is to introduce a relation “functional_-
part_of": a component must be a proper part of the whole and it must have a specified
function. Similar suggestions have been made by Galton/Mizoguchi [15] and, Vieu/
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Aurnague [30], but the latter do not refer to processes explicitly and are more focused
on properties of different parthood relations. The main point of difference here is that
the functional parts for biological mechanisms are not automatically given as such by
some previously available description, like a door handle as a functional part of a door
[30]. Rather, the explanatory achievement of a mechanism is that the components,
some biological entities like molecules, membranes etc. have certain functions that
contribute to the function of the whole.
An approach that is somewhat close to my proposal is taken by Johansson et al. [31].
These authors claim that because most functions are relational and context-dependent
with respect to a larger whole in which their bearers are imbedded, the problem of
intrinsic functions can be avoided for the “constituent functions” of body parts and,
one can add, of any subsystem of an organism. The functions of the parts are always
relative to the whole. (For an organism as a whole the problem of intrinsic function
re-appears, but that need not concern us here.) They also recognize multiple functions
of one and the same body part.
X func part of Z: = X part of Z ∧ ∃f(f instance of Function ∧ X has function f) (2)
This seems still rather weak, because the ascription of functions is context-dependent
as has been explained above. But the context is given by the mechanism we are inter-
ested in. It is as part of the mechanism mWHOLE that m has function x, not necessarily
per se. (Note the analogy to the constituent functions in the functional anatomy
approach.) For the relation of a functional part m to the mechanism as a whole
mWHOLE, we want the following conditions to hold:
(1) mWHOLE is a mechanism, i.e. it is itself an instance of a functional kind with a
specific function and realization process.
(2) m is a part of mWHOLE.
(3) The function of the part m contributes to the function of the whole mechanism
mWHOLE.
That functions contribute to outcomes of larger structures like mechanisms would be
definitional if we subscribe to the goal contribution account of functions mentioned above
and in Johanssons approach it is definitional for constituent functions. It means that the
(internal) realization process pint of the function of the part must contribute to the (exter-
nal) process pext enacted by mWHOLE. Galton and Mizoguchi [16] postulate a relation “pint
contributes_to pext“ without specifying details. Johansson et al. [31] include a clause that
explicitly refers to the larger anatomical structure in which the function-bearer performs
its function. My suggestion is to use a parthood relation between the internal processes of
the functional parts and the external process enacted by the whole. The BioTop ontology
[28,29] contains the relation “has_processual_part” for expressing parthood between pro-
cesses that seems useful here. As the same type of component may be a functional part in
different types of mechanisms (H+ ions or the cell membrane figure in many mechanisms),
but mechanisms have their functional parts as necessary components, I will use the
inverse relation has_part. Let us first define the contribution relation between functions f,
f* indicating that the realization process of f is a part of the realization of f*:
f contributes to f*:∃r∃p (f has realization r ∧ f* has realization p
∧p has processual part r) (3)
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Note that this does not imply that every processual part of the encompassing process
is a realization of a contributing function. There may well be “side effects” as the gen-
eration of heat, noise etc. will often be a concomitant result of the execution of the
function without being identical to the realization as discussed above. But all realiza-
tions of the contributing functions must clearly be processual parts of the larger pro-
cess enacted by the whole. It is to be hoped that this notion of contribution can be
refined in future work. If an internal process pint is a processual part of the realization
process pext of mWHOLE, than the participant m of pint participates as well in pext (con-
tra Galton/Mizoguchi). It follows immediately from the definition of functions that m
and mWHOLE participate in the realization processes of their respective functions, so I
will not mention that explicitly in the following:
x has func part z: = z has part z∧
∃f∃f*∃r∃P (z has function f ∧ X has function f* ∧ f* has realization r
∧f contributes to f* ∧ r has participant z)
(4)
Let us now come back to the question, what a mechanism is.
It is (1) a complex continuant ("structured biological entity” from BioTop would
be an appropriate class) that has (2) a specified biological function that is essential
for it, and that (3) necessarily has a substructure of functional parts with functions
that contribute to the function of the whole. A list of all the functional parts will
give a further ("internal”) specification of the mechanism in addition to the defini-
tion by its (external) function. Additional structural, probably topological and geo-
metrical restrictions could be added for specific mechanisms, but will not concern
us here.
Most of what has been said so far is not restricted to biological entities. One can
distinguish “artefactual” and “biological mechanisms” by demanding that the latter
are biological entities. These do not even have to be disjoint classes as there are
probably biological artefacts, like genetically modified bacteria. Still, the question
then arises whether whole organs or even whole organisms should be considered as
mechanisms. In principle they could, but usually mechanisms are supposed to explain
a particular function or phenomenon on a sub-organismic level. One could therefore
include clauses to exclude whole organs from being mechanisms. It seems straight-
forward to add such domain-specific restrictions by defining e.g. “molecular mechan-
ism” as something that has necessarily some biomolecule among its functional parts
(not just among its parts simpliciter), or to demand that the mechanism is part of
some organ.
Relations between material components and processes
So far I focused on the relation of the mechanism as a whole to its components. The
continuant components and processes of a mechanism stand in the relation of participa-
tion to each other: p has_participant x [26]. This simply follows from the conception of
a function and can usually be generalized to the type level, as many types of processes
essentially involve specific types of participants: Electron transport trivially has at least
one electron as participant. (Complications arising from the fact that often a collective
of molecules participates in a subprocess will be ignored for now. This matters if a cer-
tain concentration is necessary for a process to happen [14].) With the functional parts
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analysis this yields the statement that the functional parts of a mechanism are partici-
pants of the processes that are the realizations of these functions:
(X func part of Z ∧ X has function F ∧ R is a Process) → (F has realization R→ R
has participant X)
(5)
A converse statement is usually not true as the tokens of the participants do not
always participate in processes of type P (again obvious for electrons), but could be
formulated using a relation relative to time: × sometimes_participates_in P [26]. The
more interesting connections, though, arise from the fact that several components are
changed by participating in one internal process and by the connections of the internal
processes themselves. Although the temporal order of the internal processes is impor-
tant, a generalization is difficult, because there may also be cyclical elements or many
processes running parallel. And in many cases we do not have knowledge of the tem-
poral order. More possible relations are suggested by Grenon and Smith [32], such as
relations that express more specific relations than “has_participant” between conti-
nuants and processes like: “x initiates p”, “x terminates p”. For sake of parsimony it
seems reasonable to restrict oneself to as few as possible, but this has to be decided in
the modeling of the specific mechanism of interest.
Conclusions
It has been argued that an ontological analysis of biological mechanisms needs both
continuants as their material parts and occurents that represent the changes of these
material components. The connection of these continuants and occurents is given by
the functions that inhere in the material components and have the specific processes
as their realizations. The parts of the mechanism as well as the mechanism as a
whole are functionally identified and therefore closely linked to the processes they
enact. To make this explicit a conception of functional parts and a relation of contri-
bution between functions have been introduced. This is a step towards a systematic
causal-ontological analysis of complex biological systems. The contributions of the
functions of parts to the whole could be systematically collected on the basis of
ontologies that contain the functions of important components of biological mechan-
isms like the Gene Ontology. My goal was to bring together the rather general
account of mechanisms proposed by philosophers of biology and more rigorous con-
siderations from formal biomedical ontology. Admittedly, some details are still in
need of refinement and the analysis could be made more precise in several ways:
The context-dependence of functional parts would have to be made more explicit
and the relationship between “absolute” types like natural kinds and the context-
dependent functional kinds should be explored. One could also try to capture differ-
ences like the distinction between “active” and “passive” components of a mechanism
and between changes of already existing components and the generation of new
components. Also connections with topological and geometrical relations should be
explored, such as the specification of the spatial region the mechanism as a whole or
salient components of it occupy and the respective boundaries of a mechanism, both
with respect to its environment and those among the submechanism of a complex
mechanism.
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